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Abstract—Wireless charging technology provides a solution to
the insufficient battery life of electric vehicles (EVs). However,
the conflict of interests between wireless charging lanes (WCLs)
and EVs is difficult to resolve. In the day-ahead electricity
market, considering the revenue of WCLs caused by the deviation
between actual electricity sales and pre-purchased electricity, as
well as endurance and traveling experience of EVs, this paper
proposes a charging scheduling algorithm based on a double-
layer game model. In lower layer, the potential game is used to
model the multi-vehicle game of vehicle charging planning. A
shortest path algorithm based on the three-way greedy strategy
is designed to solve in dynamic charging sequence problem, and
the improved particle swarm optimization algorithm are used to
solve the variable ordered potential game. In the upper layer,
the reverse Stackelberg game is adopted to harmonize the cost
of wireless charging lanes and electric vehicles. As the leader,
WCLs stimulate EVs to carry out reasonable charing action
by electricity price regulation. As the follower, EVs make the
best charging decisions for a given electricity price. An iteration
algorithm is designed to ensure the Nash equilibrium convergence
of this game. The simulation results show that the double-layer
game model proposed in this paper can effectively suppress the
deviation between the actual electricity sales and the pre-sale of
the charging lane caused by the disorderly charging behavior
of the vehicle, and ensure the high endurance and traveling
experience of EVs.
Index Terms—wireless charging, reverse stackelberg game,
potential game, three-way greedy shortest path, particle swarm
optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing popularity of electric vehicles (EVs),
the traditional plug-in charging station is difficult to meet the
huge charging demand. In recent years, people have studied
the application of wireless charging technology in EVs, which
is expected to solve this problem. With this technology, EVs
can charge on the wireless charging lane (WCL) while they are
moving. However, due to the close relationship between EV
dynamic charging behavior and traffic conditions, the irregular
charging behavior of a large number of EVs is likely to have an
adverse impact on power grid, such as power failure, excessive
voltage fluctuation [1]. Therefore, the grid allows EVs to
schedule their charging plan to improve the load condition
of the grid.
There may be two energy flows between EVs and power
grid, namely grid to vehicle (G2V) and vehicle to grid (V2G).
V2G means EVs can charge or recharge on charging facilities.
In recent years, many works have studied the V2G of plug-in
EVs. In [2], G2V and V2G are combined in the path planning
problem, and the hidden Markov model is used to model the
charging behavior. Based on the improved genetic algorithm
and multi-agent communication structure, the optimal path of
EV is realized. In [3], the research studies the reverse auction
mechanism based on dynamic pricing strategy to complete
transaction matching between buyer and seller EVs, improving
the profit of sellers with weak competitiveness, and reduce the
power purchase cost of buyers.
According to whether the mobility of EVs is considered, the
charging scheduling can be divided into immovable schedule
and mobile schedule. In [4], the optimization algorithm consid-
ering the uncertainty of renewable energy and load is studied
to reduce the cost and emission of power system. EVs are only
regarded as uncertain loads of power grid in this work. The
study [5] considers the temporal and spatial changes of buses
and the accumulation of power demand in the electric public
transportation system, and designs a time slot based electricity
price scheduling strategy in the day ahead electricity market.
It can be found that the research of immovable schedule
mainly focuses on the impact of EV charging demand on the
power grid, while mobile schedule can better reflect the traffic
characteristics of vehicles.
In the wireless charging scenario, the WCLs are widely
distributed, and vehicle charging is frequent, which cause load
unbalance to the power grid. Hence V2G is not suitable.
The charging condition of EVs varies with its route, and the
dynamic charging sequence of WCLs makes the mobility of
EVs negligible. The wireless charging plan of EVs will not
only impact each other, but also affect the revenue of WCLs.
This is the major difficulty of EV charging scheduling. In this
paper, we design a double layer game model, EV-EV charging
game as the lower game and WCLs-EVs game as the upper
game, and corresponding algorithms to solve these problems.
The contribution of this paper is as follows:
• We convert the load balance requirement of power grid
into WCL revenue by establishing the electricity price
function based on the pre-purchased electricity in a day
ahead electricity market, and build the congestion per-
ception, charging value model, as well as the additional
loss model of EVs;
• We use potential game to show the game balance ex-
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istence in EV-EV charging game by designing a poten-
tial game. In addition, we design a Three way Greedy
Shortest Path (TGSP) algorithm to calculate the dynamic
charging sequence, as well as an improved Particle
Swarm Optimization (PSO) algorithm to solve the po-
tential game and get the best EV charging schedule.
• We use reverse Stackelberg game to model the WCLs-
EVs game by sharing the electricity price function and
design an iteration algorithm to obtain the optimal price
in game equilibrium.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II analyzes the relation of entities and related models of EVs
and WCLs. Section III shows double layer game model con-
sisting of EV-EV game and EVs-WCLs game. The algorithm
for resolving double layer game is provided in Section IV.
Simulations to validate our results are given in Section V.
And Section VI provides the conclusion.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. The Relation of Entities
In order to better explain the problems in this work, we de-
scribe and analyze the interaction modes and mutual influences
between entities in the vehicle wireless charging scenario.
• Power Grid and WCLs: The energies of WCLs are
purchased from the power grid. In a day ahead electricity
market, WCLs submit the predicted power consumption
of the next day to the power grid according to the
historical information, and the power grid sets the power
grid price accordingly. Because the wireless charging
is closely related to the route of vehicles, WCLs are
more likely to generate demand fluctuation, which will
cause load instability and extra cost of the grid. In our
problem, this is due to the inaccurate prediction of the
pre-purchased power by WCLs, and the grid will transfer
this loss to the purchase cost.
• WCLs and EVs: As the energy supplier and service buyer,
WCLs and EVs are the major entities of our work, whose
strategies constitute the charging scheduling. We denote
I and J as the set of EVs and WCLs respectively. The
strategy of EVs have two aspects: whether to pass through
a WCL Xi = {xij , xij ∈ {0, 1},∀j ∈ J} and the amount
of charge in WCLs U i = {uij , uij ∈ R,∀j ∈ J}, which
directly affects the revenue and the additional loss of
WCLs. By changing the price, the WCL directly affects
its own electricity sales revenue and the charging cost of
the electric vehicle, which is an effective way to stimulate
the EVs to change their charging strategy.
• EV and EV: In the transportation system, vehicles interact
with each other, which is more prominent in the wireless
charging scenario. First, the choice of WCLs will affect
the traffic flow, and correspondingly affect the driving
experience of other EVs. Moreover, the average power
supply capacity of a WCL is affected by traffic flow
[6], while the maximum charge quantity of an EV in
the WCL is limited by this WCL’s average power supply
capacity, so the selection of WCLs indirectly affects the
upper bound of the charge quantity of other vehicles. In
addition, the EV charging affect the electricity sales of
WCLs, which influences charging price, thus indirectly
affecting the charging cost of other EVs in the same
WCL.
B. WCL Related Models
1) WCL Price Function: WCLs adjust the hourly electricity
price to drive EVs to make charging plan that meets the
supplies of WCLs. In the pricing strategy, it is necessary to
consider the deviation between the pre-purchased electricity
and the actual sold electricity to prevent the additional loss.
Thus the price function consists of two parts: basic price and
deviation price, as shown in (1).
P (Uj) = p0 + qj(Uj − U˜j), (1)
where p0 and qj are the basic price and the price coefficient,
respectively. Uj and U˜j denote the actual sold electricity and
the predicted quantity, respectively.
2) WCL Maximum Charge Quantity: The maximum charge
quantity of an EV is limited by real-time traffic condition.
In our problem, we offer charging plans for multiple EVs
without gathering real-time information of a single EV. So
we define the average hourly charge amount of an EV as the
WCL maximum charge quantity. In [6] we can get the average
hourly charge amount of WCL as (4):
s =
Ljfj
vj
, (2)
ξ =
2d¯2
vmin
− 1
fj
, (3)
Uavrj =
pLjfj
vj
+ pnjs(T
r
j +
(1 + s)
2
ξ), (4)
where fj and vj denote the traffic flow (vehicles per hour)
and average vehicle speed of WCL j, respectively. Lj and p
is the length and power of WCL j, respectively. T rj denotes
the average red traffic light duration at the WCL j allocated
intersection and nj denotes the number of traffic light cycles
in an hour. vmin denotes the minimum speed for leaving the
intersection and d¯2 denotes the vehicle to vehicle distance
between stopped EVs. s and ξ are intermediate variables. Uavrj
denotes the average total charge of EVs in one hour on WCL
j. For the convenience of analysis, we make an assumption to
simplify the model:When the actual traffic flow is within the
small range ±ω of the predicted value, the average vehicle
speed can be regarded as the same as the predicted value.
This assumption is meaningful for the reason that the pre-
purchased electricity is based on the predicted traffic condition.
If the deviation of actual and predicted traffic flow is too large,
the actual sold electricity will deviate from the pre-purchased
quantity. In addition, in order to maintain stable traffic flow,
the traffic center will not allow large fluctuations in traffic
flow. Hence we can simplify (4) into (5):
Uavrj = ajf
2
j + djfj + cj , (5)
where aj ,dj and cj are constant coefficient. cj = −pnjLj
2vj
,
which means half of the charge obtained when the vehicle
passes the WCL at speed vj multiplied by nj , is a very small
part that can be abandoned. Finally, we can conclude that the
maximum charge quantity an EV can obtain from a WCL is
linear to the traffic flow, as shown in (6):
uj(fj) =
Uavrj
fj
= ajfj + dj . (6)
C. EV Related Models
1) Additional Loss by Charging Route: Different charging
routes may generate additional traveling time and energy con-
sumption, which is compared with the shortest route between
the start and the destination of a vehicle. For the estimated time
and energy consumption of the selected route, we multiply the
route length by the corresponding coefficient, and convert it
into economic loss, as (7) and (8):
C(s,X, d) = p0p¯c(L(s,X, d)− L(s, d)), (7)
T (s,X, d) = p1p¯t(L(s,X, d)− L(s, d)), (8)
where p0 and p1 are the basic electricity price and the per
capita hourly wage, respectively. p¯c and p¯t are the average
energy and time cost per kilometer. s and d denote the start
and destination respectively, and X denotes the WCL choice.
L(s, d) calculates the shortest route length from the start to the
end, and L(s,X, d) calculates the length of the shortest route
through the selected WCLs. We will talk about it in IV-A.
2) Congestion Perception: The driving experience of ve-
hicles is affected by road congestion. Such a congestion is
closely related traffic flow, which is the major way for vehicles
to percept congestion. The larger traffic flow is, the higher
the degree of congestion that vehicles feel, and this feeling
is stronger with more vehicles [7]. Therefore, this congestion
perception of vehicles is modeled as (9):
D(fj) = εf
2
j , (9)
where ε is the congestion perception coefficient.
3) Charging Value: In the process of EV traveling, the
driver hopes to charge as much as possible when passing
through the WCLs, so as to increase the vehicle’s endurance.
Therefore, more charging quantity can bring greater benefits
to an EV. We define this benefits as charging value and the
charging value increases linearly with the charge quantity, as
shown in (10):
R(uij) = p¯ru
i
j , (10)
where p¯r is the converting coefficient and uij is the charge
quantity of EV i at WCL j. For different EV, the lower the
initial state of charge (SOC) is, the greater p¯r is.
III. DOUBLE-LAYER GAME
As mentioned above, WCLs’ electricity price adjustment
and EVs’ charging decision will have mutual influence. WCLs
want to improve the profit of electricity sales and EVs want
to reduce the charging cost, which is the conflict of interest
between them. For EVs, the conflicts between their decisions
have also been discussed above. In order to solve the above
two kinds of contradiction, we build a double-layer game
model. The upper layer is the game between WCLs and EVs,
and the lower layer is the game between EVs.
A. Lower Layer: Game Between EVs
As for the lower layer game, we take potential game to prove
the existence of Nash equilibrium in the wireless charging
game of EVs. Potential game maps the changes of individual
cost to the common cost function by constructing the potential
function. This model also simplifies the process in the upper
layer game.
1) EV Cost Function: Every vehicle is a selfish individual,
hoping to reduce the cost of purchasing electricity while ensur-
ing sufficient power to travel, and avoiding detour. Therefore,
we take the sum of EV losses in subsection II-C as the
cost function of each EV, and get the objective function and
constraints of an individual vehicle i as follows:
min
Xi,Ui
∑
j∈{j|xij=1}
[
P
(
UFj
)
uij +D (fj)−R
(
uij
)]
+ C (si, Xi, di) + T (si, Xi, di) (11)
s.t. UFj =
∑
i∈I
uij , (12)
fj =
∑
i∈I
xij , (13)
0 ≤ uij ≤ uj(fj), (14)
uisk ≤ bmax − bisk , sk ∈
{
j|xij = 1
}
, (15)
bisk ≥ bmin, sk ∈
{
j|xij = 1
}
, (16)
bid ≥ bmin, (17)
(1− ω)f˜j ≤ fj ≤ (1 + ω)f˜j . (18)
where {j|xij = 1} means the chosen WCLs. bmax and bmin
denote the maximum SOC of EVs and lower bound of SOC
requirement respectively, which are the same for all EVs.
(14) and (15) limit EV charging capacity not to exceeding
WCL maximum charge quantity and its maximum SOC,
respectively. (16) and (17) ensure EV can arrive each chosen
WCL and destination. (18) means that the traffic flow of WCL
is near the predicted value. It should be noted that although
EVs do not consider constraint (18), as the game coordinator,
the traffic center will impose this constraint to the lower layer
game to maintain the stability of traffic flow.
Besides, it should be noted that bij is the SOC of an EV
at WCL j, which changes with different WCL sequence. The
dynamic SOC model is:
bis
bis1
...
bisn
bid
 =

bis
bis − p¯cL (s, s1)
...
bisn−1 − p¯cL (sn−1, sn) + uisn−1
bisn − p¯cL (sn, d) + uisn
 , (19)
where sk is a WCL in an ordered charging sequence.
2) Potential Function Construction: For the convenience of
analysis, we divide (11) into three parts:
J1EV (ai, a−i) =
∑
j∈{j|xij=1}
P
(
UFj
)
uij , (20)
J2EV (ai, a−i) =
∑
j∈{j|xij=1}
D (fj) , (21)
J3EV (ai, a−i) =
∑
j∈{j|xij=1}
R
(
uij
)
+ C (si, Xi, di) + T (si, Xi, di) . (22)
where ai = {Xi, uij , j ∈ J}. The interaction of charging
cost and traffic congestion between EVs are reflected in J1EV
and J2EV . J
3
EV is only about the loss of an EV itself. To
show the lower layer game is a potential game, we define the
corresponding functions:
Φ1 (ai, a−i) =
∑
j∈J
P
(
UFj
)
UFj , (23)
Φ2 (ai, a−i) =
∑
j∈J
fj∑
k=1
D(k), (24)
Φ3 (ai, a−i) =
∑
i∈I
[C (si, Xi, di) + T (si, Xi, di)]
−
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈{j|xij=1}
R
(
uij
)
, (25)
Next we consider the change in the J iEV and Φ
i due to an
action change of EV i. We can write:
J1EV (ai, a−i)− J1EV (a′i, a−i)
=
∑
ai\a′i
[
P (UFj ) + qu
′i
j
] (
uij − u′ij
)
,
Φ1 (ai, a−i)− Φ1 (a′i, a−i)
=
∑
ai\a′i
[
P (UFj ) + q(U
F
j + u
′i
j − uij)
] (
uij − u′ij
)
.
J2EV (ai, a−i)− J2EV (a′i, a−i)
=
∑
j∈Xi\X′i
D (fj)−
∑
j∈X′i\Xi
D (fj + 1) ,
Φ2 (ai, a−i)− Φ2 (a′i, a−i)
=
∑
j∈Xi\X′i
D (fj)−
∑
j∈X′i\Xi
D (fj + 1) ,
J3EV (ai, a−i)− J3EV (a′i − a−i)
= Φ3 (ai, a−i)− Φ3 (a′i, a−i)
(26)
Finally noting that Φ = Φ1 + Φ2 + Φ3 and JEV = J1EV +
J2EV + J
3
EV , if JEV (ai, a−i) − JEV (a′i, a−i) > 0, we have
Φ(ai, a−i)−Φ(a′i, a−i) > 0, This shows that Φ(·) is an ordinal
potential function for the game, and hence, it admits a pure-
strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE) [8].
B. Upper Layer: Game Between WCLs and EVs
As for the upper layer game, we use reverse Stackelberg
game to model it. This game is a dynamic game with incom-
plete information, which is applicable to the situation that the
leader and the follower know few about each other. The leader
can obtain the follower’s information by informing followers
about leaders’ decision function of the follower decision, so as
to stimulate the follower to carry out certain cooperation. In
our problem, WCLs are leaders and EVs are followers. WCLs
guide EVs through the price function, so that the total charge
of EVs is close to their expected value.
1) Reverse Stackelberg Game Process:
• WCLs broadcast their price function P (Uj) to EVs,
• According to the price function, EVs give their own
charging plan and feed it back to WCLs;
• According to the charging plan of EVs, WCLs calculate
the actual electricity price according to the previously
determined price function, and inform all vehicles;
• All EVs are charged according to their charging plans,
and the corresponding fees shall be paid.
2) WCLs utility funciton: As the electricity seller, WCLs
have two objectives, increasing electricity sales and decreasing
additional loss caused by the deviation of actual sold electricity
and predicted quantity. Hence the utility function is as follows:
max
ULj ,qj
JWCL =
∑
j∈J
[
P
(
ULj
)
ULj − µ
(
ULj − U˜j
)2]
(27)
s.t. ULj ≥ 0, (28)
P (ULj ) ≥ 0, (29)
where µ is the additional cost coefficient, which is larger than
price coefficient qj .
It should be noted that the actual decision of the WCL j is
qj . ULj is the desired electricity sale of the WCL, while the
actual sale UFj is determined by EVs rather than the WCL.
Therefore, the best qj that guide UFj to approach U
L
j cannot
be obtained from (27). Through the upper layer game process,
the leader continuously changes qj to guide the follower
decision, such that the final UFj is consistent with U
L
j . This
principle helps us to design the iteration algorithm for reverse
stackelberg game in IV-C.
IV. ALGORITHM
A. TGSP Based Shortest Charging Sequence Algorithm
We have mentioned shortest charging route length func-
tion L() in II-B1. In this subsection, we will introduce this
function, which is obtained by TGSP based shortest charging
sequence algorithm. The algorithm process is as follows:
i Build Distance Matrix: Since we know the node con-
nections of the road network and the distance between
adjacent nodes, we choose Floyd algorithm to calculate the
node distance matrix, which contains the distance between
any two intersections.
ii Determine charging sequence: To find the length of short-
est path going through chosen WCLs, we have to deter-
mine the sequence of WCLs. With n chosen WCLs, the
sequence permutation complexity is O(n!). As n increases,
it will cost much time to find the best sequence. Because
the vehicle charging route is generally towards the end
point, based on the greedy idea, we search the shortest
sequence in three ways: forward searching, backward
searching and searching from both ends to the middle.
The algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
iii Shortest Length Calculation: From the results of previous
step, the shortest charging path length can be obtained as
min{Len1, Len2, Len3}.
B. Improved PSO
In the lower layer potential game, the change trend of
potential function value is the same as that of the individual
cost. Finding the optimal decision for the potential function
is equivalent to finding the best decision for each EV. In
this problem, the traffic center, as the game coordinator,
is responsible for calculating and notifying the results of
vehicle charging planning. As potential function Φ makes
the EV-EV game a Mixed Integer NonLinear Programming
(MINLP) problem and the dynamic SOC of EVs needs to
be calculated after the charging sequence is determined, we
design an improved PSO algorithm to solve this problem. First,
we divide Φ into two parts: the nonlinear programming of
charging quantity planing with fixed Xi P 1, and the integer
programming of WCL selection P 2:
P 1 : min
Ui
obj1(U i|X∗i ) =
∑
j∈J
P
(
UFj
)
UFj
−
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈{j|xij=1}
R
(
uij
)
(30)
s.t. (12), (14) ∼ (17).
P 2 : min
Xi
obj2(Xi) =
∑
i∈I
[C (si, Xi, di) + T (si, Xi, di)]
+
∑
j∈J
fj∑
k=1
D(k) (31)
s.t. (13), (18).
By calculating the Hessian matrix, it is easy to show that P 1
is a convex problem. Due to the dynamic SOC constrains (15)
∼ (17), it’s hard to get the general form of solution, but can be
solved by solvers like CPLEX. The traditional PSO algorithm
is not good at solving integer programming [9]. Hence, to
solve P 2, we make following improvements:
• Position Updating: When the iteration is more than a
certain number of times, the particles are nearly stable.
In order to accelerate convergence, we update particles’
velocity and position in the following way:
Vi = C1rand(0, 1) (Pi −Xi)+C2rand(0, 1) (Pg −Xi) ,
(32)
Algorithm 1 TGSP
Require: Distance matrix G∗, the start and destination of EVs
s, d, chosen WCLs X , the beginning and end intersection
of WCLs b, e.
Ensure: Shortest charging sequence S and length Len.
1: Initialize sequence S1, S2, S3, length Len1, Len2, Len3.
2: Forward searching: last = s
3: while Some chosen WCLs are not sorted in S1 do
4: for Each j ∈ residual WCLs do
5: dist = G∗(last, bj) +G∗(bj , ej), last = ej ,
6: end for
7: put the WCL with the shortest dist into S1 in order,
8: Len1 = Len1 + dist.
9: end while
10: Backward searching: last = d
11: while Some chosen WCLs are not sorted in S2 do
12: for Each j ∈ residual WCLs do
13: dist = G∗(last, ej) +G∗(bj , ej), last = sj ,
14: end for
15: put the WCL with the shortest dist into S2 reversely,
16: Len2 = Len2 + dist.
17: end while
18: Searching from both ends to the middle: lastl =
s, lastr = d
19: num =
∑
X , numhalf = num/2 rounded down.
20: for k = numhalf do
21: for j ∈ residual WCLs do
22: dist = G∗(last, bj) +G∗(bj , ej), lastl = ej ,
23: end for
24: put the WCL with the shortest dist into S3 in order,
25: Len3 = Len3 + dist.
26: for Each j ∈ residual WCLs do
27: dist = G∗(last, ej) +G∗(bj , ej), lastr = sj ,
28: end for
29: put the WCL with the shortest dist into S3 reversely,
30: Len3 = Len3 + dist.
31: end for
32: if num%2 == 0 then
33: Len3 = Len3 +G∗(lastl, lastr),
34: else
35: the last WCL j,Len3 = Len3 + G∗(lastl, bj) +
G∗(bj , ej) +G∗(ej , lastr)
36: end if
37: return Len = min{Len1, Len2, Len3} and correspond-
ing sequence S.
s = Sigmoid(Vi) =
{
1− 21+exp(−Vi) , if Vi ≤ 0,
2
1+exp(−Vi) − 1, if Vi > 0.
(33)
if Vi < 0, Xi =
{
0 random(0,1) < s,
Xi others.
(34)
if Vi > 0, Xi =
{
1 random(0,1) < s,
Xi others.
(35)
Xi and Vi are the position and velocity of particles
respectively. Pi and Pg are the best individual position
and group position respectively. (32) means that at the
later stage of iteration, particles only approach to the
best position of individuals and populations. (33) ∼ (35)
reduces the possibility of large changes in the position
of low-speed particle, and improves the probability of
approaching the historical best position for high-speed
particles.
• Constrains Handling: When particles search, they may
exceed the constraints (18). We add the overstep value as
a penalty term to particles’ fitness. The penalty term is
as follows:
θ(Xi) = max{0,
∑
i∈I
xij − (1 + ω)f˜j}
+ max{0, (1− ω)f˜j −
∑
i∈I
xij},
(36)
fit(Xi) = obj
1(U i∗|Xi) + obj2(Xi) + λθ(Xi), (37)
where λ is a large constant.
C. Reverse Stackelberg Game Iteration
When the game reach equilibrium point, the total charge
quantity in follower and leader optimization should be the
same. Based on this, we design the iterative algorithm as
follows:
i Initialize electricity price coefficient Q0 = {qj,0|j ∈ J};
ii Bring Qj,k−1 (or Qj,0) into lower layer potential game,
and get the best strategy {X∗i,k|i ∈ I} and {UF∗j,k |j ∈ J};
iii Bring Qj,k−1 (or Qj,0) into (27), and get the best strategy
{UL∗j,k |j ∈ J};
iv Update the price coefficient qj,k with the difference of UF∗j,k
and UL∗j,k as follows, to reduce the difference [10]:
qj,k+1 = qj,k + l
(
UF∗j,k − UL∗j,k
)
, (38)
l =
1
ϕ+ k
, (39)
where l is the learning rate that decreases with the number
of iterations k, and ϕ is a positive constant.
v Check the convergence condition:
|UF∗j,k − UL∗j,k | ≤ σ. (40)
If (40) is satisfied, output the final follower schedule
{X∗i,k|i ∈ I} and {UF∗j,k |j ∈ J}, and leader strategy Qk;
otherwise continue iteration k = k + 1 until reach the
iteration limit.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Experiment Settings
In this paper, SUMO is used for simulation. For the con-
venience of analysis, we build a road network which includes
50 roads of 1km in length. 4 roads are selected to lay the
WCLs of 40m in length. bmax = 5kWh, bmin = 0.5kWh,
initialized SOC bi0 is randomly assigned between 2.5kWh ∼
5kWh. ω = 0.2, p0 = 0.5, α = 0.01, σ = 1, ϕ = 500. EVs
departure from the southwest corner to the northeast corner
within 5 hours, and the traffic flow gradually increases from
24 per hour to 60 per hour.
B. Experiment Results
1) Algorithm Effect:
• TGSP: We choose 4 ∼ 8 roads to install WCLs in the road
network, and observe the length of charging sequence
route calculated by TGSP compared with the shortest
route after traversing all sequences. From TABLE I, we
can see that TGSP can obtain basically the same short
charging sequence in a shorter time.
TABLE I: Comparison of TGSP and Traversal
WCLs Methods Sequence Length(km) Time(ms)
4 Traversal [1,3,2,4] 18 0.2TGSP [1,3,4,2] 18 0.2
5 Traversal [1,3,5,2,4] 18 0.4TGSP [1,3,5,4,2] 18 0.2
6 Traversal [1,3,5,4,6,2] 20 1.1TGSP [1,3,5,4,6,2] 20 0.3
7 Traversal [1,3,5,6,2,4,7] 20 3.5TGSP [1,3,5,6,2,4,7] 20 0.4
8 Traversal [6,1,3,5,7,2,4,8] 20 25.2TGSP [3,5,7,2,6,1,4,8] 22 0.5
• Improved PSO: In order to reduce the randomness of the
experiment, we have carried out the same PSO process
five times, and take the average value. Fig. 6 shows that,
the improved PSO converges faster than the traditional
PSO, and it is more likely to get lower fitness because
particles search near the historical best value rather than
moving randomly and substantially in the later stage.
2) EVs Results:
• Average charge quantity: From Fig. 1 we can see that,
with the increase of initial SOC, the average charge of
EVs decreases. This is because EVs with lower initial
power has higher charging demand to ensure the en-
durance. EVs with sufficient electricity will choose road
without the WCL to avoid traffic congestion.
• Average energy cost: Fig. 2 shows that EVs with higher
initial SOC cost fewer energy, which indicates that they
can choose the shortest path to reach the destination,
while EVs with lower initial SOC may take a detour to
find a WCL to maintain their SOC.
• Average residual energy: Fig. 3 shows that EVs with
different initial SOC are able to maintain sufficient power
after finishing the trip.
3) WCLs Results:
• Electricity price: Fig. 4 shows that when the traffic flow
is low, the WCL attract EVs to charge with low price. As
the traffic flow increases, the electricity price increases to
discourage some EVs with weak charging demand.
• Deviation of charge quantity: Fig. 5 indicates that when
the traffic flow increases, it is easier for WCLs to guide
EVs’ total charge approach the predicted value.
Fig. 1: Average charged quantity. Fig. 2: Average electricity cost. Fig. 3: Average residual SOC.
Fig. 4: The charging price. Fig. 5: The total sold electricity. Fig. 6: PSO convergence.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, to find a good charging schedule for WCLs
and EVs, we describe the relationship between power grid,
WCLs and EVs to illustrate the mutual benefit impact. Then
we define the important models, including the price function
of WCLs, the maximum charging quantity model and loss
models of EVs. In order to coordinate the income balance
between EVs, we use the potential game model to prove the
existence of NE in the EV-EV charging game, and design
the TGSP algorithm to solve the dynamic charging sequence,
as well as the improved PSO algorithm to solve the MINLP
potential game. In order to balance the benefits of WCLs
and EVs, we use the reverse Stackelberg game model to
help WCLs stimulate EVs’ charging plan through the price
function, and design the iteration algorithm to get the optimal
decision of both sides. The numerical simulation results show
that the charging sequence obtained by TGSP algorithm is
consistent with the shortest sequence, and the improved PSO
algorithm has better convergence. The proposed double-layer
game model can achieve a good balance effect on the ben-
efits of both WCLs and EVs. Through a reasonable price
adjustment scheme, WCLs can achieve a higher balance of
electricity sales, and EVs with different SOC can complete the
process of supplying electricity under the condition of lower
energy consumption.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was supported by National Natural Science
Foundation of China (61731012, 61573245 and 61933009).
REFERENCES
[1] K. Clement-Nyns, E. Haesen, and J. Driesen, “The impact of charging
plug-in hybrid electric vehicles on a residential distribution grid,” IEEE
Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 371–380, Feb 2010.
[2] A. Abdulaal, M. H. Cintuglu, S. Asfour, and O. A. Mohammed, “Solving
the multivariant ev routing problem incorporating v2g and g2v options,”
IEEE Transactions on Transportation Electrification, vol. 3, no. 1, pp.
238–248, March 2017.
[3] H. Liu, Y. Zhang, S. Zheng, and Y. Li, “Electric vehicle power trading
mechanism based on blockchain and smart contract in v2g network,”
IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 160 546–160 558, 2019.
[4] A. Y. Saber and G. K. Venayagamoorthy, “Resource scheduling under
uncertainty in a smart grid with renewables and plug-in vehicles,” IEEE
Systems Journal, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 103–109, March 2012.
[5] M. Shafie-khah, E. Heydarian-Forushani, M. Golshan, P. Siano,
M. Moghaddam, M. Sheikh-El-Eslami, and J. Catalo, “Optimal trading
of plug-in electric vehicle aggregation agents in a market environment
for sustainability,” Applied Energy, vol. 162, pp. 601 – 612, 2016.
[6] T. Wang, B. Yang, C. Chen, and X. Guan, “Wireless charging lane
deployment in urban areas considering traffic light and regional energy
supply-demand balance,” in VTC2019-Spring, April 2019, pp. 1–5.
[7] S. R. Etesami, W. Saad, N. Mandayam, and H. V. Poor, “Smart routing
in smart grids,” in 2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and
Control (CDC), Dec 2017, pp. 2599–2604.
[8] D. Monderer and L. S. Shapley, “Potential games,” Games and Economic
Behavior, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 124 – 143, 1996.
[9] Z. Wu, N. Ma, Z. Zeng, and J. Xu, “Integer programming models to
manage consensus for uncertain mcgdm based on pso algorithms,” IEEE
Transactions on Fuzzy Systems, vol. 27, no. 5, pp. 888–902, May 2019.
[10] F. Wei, Z. Jing, P. Z. Wu, and Q. Wu, “A stackelberg game approach for
multiple energies trading in integrated energy systems,” Applied Energy,
vol. 200, pp. 315 – 329, 2017.
